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SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF
VIRGINIA.'
BIBBS ADMR. V. NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILROAD.
SYLLABUS.

Negligence- Indefiendent Contractor- Respondent Supierior.- A
railroad company made a contract with A to build a bridge. The company were to furnish the material, and, through their chief-engineer,
were to have the right to criticise the work, but not to control it. The
workmen-among whom was the plaintiff's intestate-were engaged and
paid by the contractor, whose foreman directed their movements. In
consequence of the foreman's negligence, a train fell through the bridge
and the plaintiff's intestate was killed. In an action by his administrator
against the railroad, it was held (I) that A was an "independent contractor," and that the relation of master and servant did not subsist
between the railroad company and the plaintiff's intestate; and (2) that
the railroad company was not liable to the plaintiff for the negligence of
its employee.
Hole v. Ry. Co. (6 Hurl. & N., 488) and Chicago v. Robbins (2 Black,
418) disapproved; Butler v. Hunter (7 Hurl. & N., 826) and Scdmmon v.
Chicago (25 Ill., 424) followed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
In 1887 the Norfolk and Western Railroad contracted for a gross
sum with one Fred. H. Smith-a professional bridge-builder of large experience-for the erection of an iron bridge over Big Otter River, in place
of the old bridge at that point, the work to be so carried on so as not to
interfere with the running of the company's trains. By the terms of the
contract the company was to furnish all material, including that required
for trestling, or a carry span, which was made necessary by the plans in
order to support the weight on the bridge, while the work was being
done. The company did not furnish enough material for trestling from
pier to pier, but only for a trestling next each pier, leaving a space of
sixty feet in the centre unsupported; but that furnished was of sufficient
strength, and the contractor made no request for more. In a conversation
prior to the contract it was agreed between the contractor and the chiefengineer of the company, who acted as its representative, that this contract should be subject to the provisions of a former contract for the
erection of another bridge, which provided that the contractor should use
all necessary precaution and safeguards against accident; or injuries, and
should save the company harmless from all damages recovered against it
for any accidents or damage not due to obeying the written orders of the
company's engineer, under protest. The work was also to be subject to
the supervision of the chief-engineer of the company, who had the right
I Reported in 14 S. E. Rep., 163, and 87 Va., 71i.
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to criticise the method of erection and the workmanship, but not to
direct the method of erection. He could stop the trains, however, if the
bridge was unsafe. His subordinate, who had the same powers, was on
the spot every day, and the day of the accident had but just left the
bridge when it fell.
All the workmen were engaged and paid by the contractor, and the
work was done under the direction of his foreman. It was agreed
between the parties that the company's trains should not pass over the
bridge during its erection until the signal to pass should be given by the
foreman. At the time of the accident two of the spans were complete;
one had not been touched, and the fourth was incomplete, the old work
having been cut away, and the new work not yet sufficiently braced and
strengthened. The foreman gave the signal to cross to a heavy coal
train, and while it was crossing the bridge gave way and fell, in consequence of the incomplete condition of that span, and caused the death
of the plaintiff's intestate, who was one of the contractor's workmen,
engaged in the erection of the bridge.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
RICHARDSON,

J. (after stating the facts), said:

The question presented by the record before us is one
of first impression in this State, and is one of great practical importance. It is whether a railroad company, or any
person, natural or artificial, who undertakes the erection or
repair of a building or other work for his own benefit,
is responsible for injuries to third persons, occasioned by
the negligence of a servant of the builder or the person
who is actually engaged in erecting the building or other
work under an independent employment or a general contract for that purpose. Such is the general scope and
bearing of the question presented. But in the light of the
peculiar circumstances of the case in hand, the question is
one of yet more special significance, and may be stated
thus: Can the railroad company in this case be held liable
in damages for the death of the plaintiff's intestate, the
latter, at the time of. the accident, which resulted in his
death, being the employee and servant, not of the railroad
company, but of one Fred. H. Smith, who was at the time
in the exercise of an independent employment, and engaged
in erecting the bridge over Big Otter, under a contract
with said company, the work to be done for a stipulated
price for the job complete, the railroad company reserving
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no right of control as to the means and methods of doing
the work contracted for? The question thus stated presents
in outline the case made by the pleadings and facts certified
as proved, and upon which our decision must be based.
To arrive at the proper solution of the question above
propounded, it is necessary, in the first place, to inquire
into what constitutes an independent contractor. In Mechem's valuable work on Agency, he makes the following
clear statement of the law: "The principal's liability for
the act of his agent, within the scope of his authority, depends upon the fact that the relation of principal and agent
exists. It is the principal's will that is to be exercised;
his purpose that is to be accomplished; his.are the benefits
and advantages which ensue. He selects his own agent,
puts him in motion, and has the right to direct and control
his actions. It is, therefore, just and proper that he should
be responsible for what the agent does while so employed.
When, however, the principal has not this right to control,
a different rule prevails. Neither reason nor justice requires that he should be held responsible for the manner
of doing an act when he had no power or right to direct or
control the manner."' And in this connection the author
quotes with approbation the remark of Baron ROLFE, in
Hobbit v. Railway Co.,' "that the liability of any one other
than the party actually guilty of any wrongful act proceeds on the maxim qui facilzier alium facilfer se. The
party employing has the selection of the party employed,
and it is reasonable that he who has made choice of an
unskilful or careless person to execute his orders should be
responsible for any injury resulting from the want of skill
or want of care of the person employed; but neither the
principle of the rule nor the rule itself can apply to the
rule when the party sought to be charged does not stand in
the character of employer to the party by whose negligent act
The same author further
the injury has been occasioned."
says: "If, therefore, the principal, using due care in the
selection of the person, enters into a contract with a person
exercising an independent employment, by virtue of which
I Alechem Ag., P 747.

2 4 Exch., 255.
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the latter undertakes to accomplish a given result, being at*
liberty to select and employ his own means and methods,
and the principar retains no right or power to control or
direct the manner in which the work shall be done, such a
contract does not create the relations of principal and
agent or master and servant, and the person contracting
for the work is not liable for the negligence of the
contractor, or of his servants or agents, in the performance
of the work. The employment is regarded as independent when the person renders service in the course of an
occupation, representing the will of his employer only
as to -the result of his work, and not as to the means by
which it is accomplished."
And the author further says:
"The independent contractor is usually .paid, in the common parlance, by the job; but the fact that he is paid by
the day does not necessarily destroy the independent character of his employment."
"This rule of immunity from
liability," says the author, "is, however, subject to certain exceptions. No one can lawfully delegate to another
the authority to do an unlawful act, nor can one upon
whom the law imposes the performance of a duty relieve
himself from responsibility for its non-performance by
committing its performance to a substitute. Thus, if the
thing to be done is in itself unlawful, or if it is per se a
nuisance, or if it cannot be done without doing damage,
he who causes it to be done by another, be the latter
servant, agent or independent contractor, is as much liable
for injuries which may happen to third persons from the
act done as though he had done the act in person."
" So
it is the duty," says the same author, " of every person
who does in person, or causes to be done by another, an
act which from its nature is liable, unless precautions are
taken, to do injury to others, to see to it that those precautions are taken; and he cannot escape this duty by turning
the performance over to a contractor. Of the same nature
is the duty which the law imposes upon every person, who,
for his own purposes, brings on his lands, and collects or
keeps there, anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
to geep it in at his peril; and, if he does not do so, he is

OPINION OF THIE COURT.

fprima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape."
In stating the first branch of this proposition, the author
was not as guarded in the language employed as he might
and perhaps should have been, in the light of the decided
cases upon which he seems to have based his statement of
the principle. The language, at first blush, seems to be
open to the interpretation that every person, natural or
artificial, who does in person, or causes to be done by
another, work which from its nature is liable, unless precautions are taken, to do injury to others, must see to it in
person that the necessary precautions are taken, and cannot
escape liability for the non-performance of such duty by
turning the whole performance over to a contractor, although
the employer has exercised proper care in the selection of
a skilful and competent person, exercising an independent
employment, and has contracted with such person for the
execution of the entire work by the means and methods of
his own selection. Work is constantly being performed
by independent contractors, as well as others, which, in the
nature of things, may, in the course of its execution, result
in injury to others; but it by no means follows that an
employer in any such case must personally supervise the
work and see that the necessary precautions are taken, and
that for his failure to do so he must be held liable in damages for injuries to other persons ; for if, in the nature of
things, the mere liability of the work to result in injury to
some one be made the test, then it is obvious that the line
of distinction becomes shadowy and indistinct between acts
which are unlawful or are per se nuisances, or that cannot
be done without doing damage, and those the performance
of which not only may, but; in the nature of things, must,
often be committed to others; as in the case with a railway
company in the construction and repair of its roadway,
bridges and other structures. This view seems to be in
unison with the real meaning of the author himself, if we
are to judge by the decided cases to which he refers; for
immediately in connection with his statement bf the distinction now under consideration he makes this remark:
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"This distinction has been stated in a recent case, as follows," referring to and quoting the language of PowERs, J.,
in Bailey v. Railroad Co., 1 where it is said: "If the work
to be done is committed to a contractor to be done in his
own way, and is one from which, if properly done, no injurious consequences to third persons can arise, then the
contractor is liable for' the. negligent performance of the
work. If, however, the work is one that will result in
injury to others unless preventive measures be adopted, .the
employer cannot relieve himself from liability by employing a contractor to do what it was his duty to do to prevent
such injurious consequences. In the latter case the duty
to so conduct one's own business as not to injure another
continuously remains with the employer." There is manifestly a broad distinction between the statement of the
author (Mechem) and that of the judge whose language is
quoted, as illustrating the distinction stated by the former.
In the former the author makes the fact that the act to be
performed is, in its nature, liable to result in injury to
others, the test; while the judge, whose language is quoted,
applies as the test the fact that the work is one that will
result in injury to others unless preventive measures be
adopted. But we find the principle nowhere more justly,
clearly and satisfactorily stated than in 2 Wood, Ry. Law,
§ 284, pp. 1012, 1013, where the author, quoti.ng the language of APPLETON, J., in Eaton v. Railway Co.,2 says:

"When the contract is to do an act in itself lawful, it is
presumed it is to be done in a lawful manner. Unless,
therefore, the relation of master and servant exist, the party
contracting is not responsible for the negligent or tortious
acts of the person with whom the contract is made, especially
if those acts are outside of the contract. If the injury was
the natural result of work contracted to be done, and it
could not be accomplished without causing the injury, the
person contracting for doing it would be held responsible."
The same author then proceeds to say-: "If the company
can be said to have co-operated in the act which produces
the injury, it is liable; and this is always the case when
157 Vt., 252.

2,59 M'e., 520.,
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the act must necessarily be productive of a nuisance ;"'
and the author adds the remark : "In all cases it will be
presumed that the act was to be done in a lawful manner,
and with proper care and skill."
The principle just stated is well illustrated by the case
of Reedie v. Railway Co.,' reported with Hobbit v. Railway Co., supra. In that case the railway company had let
out by contract the building of a viaduct, which was a
part of their railway, to contractors. Through the negligence of the men employed by the contractors a heavy
stone was dropped from the work, and, falling upon the
plaintifi's husband, who was lawfully passing along the
highway, killed him ; and in an action by the wife for this
injiiry it was held that the company was not liable. And
in delivering the opinion of the Court Baron ROLFE used
this language: "The liability of any one other than the
party actually guilty of any wrongful act proceeds on the
maxim qui fadiier alium facit tier se. The party employing has the selection of the party employed, -and it is
reasonable that he who has made choice of an unskilful or
careless person to execute his orders should be responsible
for any injury resulting from the want of skill or want of
care in the person employed ; but neither the principle of
the rule nor the rule itself can apply to a case where the
party sought to be charged does not stand in the character
of employer to the party by whose negligence the injury
has been occasioned." And the learned Baron, in support
of the view thus presented, referred to the cases of Quarman v. Burnett,3 Rapson v. Cubitt,4 and Milligan v. Wedge,'
-as settling the principle ; and then in recognition of the
same principle, laid down by LITTLEDALE, J., in Laugher
v. Pointer,6 the same learned Baron remarked in substance
that to decide that the railway company was liable would
I Citing Railroad Co. v. Mleador, 50 Tex., 77 ; Robinson v. Vebb, ii
Bush, 464; Ellis v. Gas Co., 2 El. & BI., 767; Peachey v. Rowland, 13
C. B., 182; Reedie v. Railway Co., 4 ExCh., 244; King v. Railroad Co.,
66 N. Y., 181 ; Congreve v. Mlorgan, 5 Duer, 495.
36 Mees. & W., 497.
24 ExCh., 244.
49 Mees. & W., 709.
"512 Adol. & E., 737.
65 Barn. & C., 560.
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be equivalent to deciding that the contractors-whose servant did the injury, were not liable-a proposition which
could not be maintained. Laugher v. Pointer, szqfra, was
an action to recover damages for an injury done to a horse
of the plaintiff, by the negligence of another person, under
these circumstances : The defendant owned a carriage, and
hired of a stable-keeper a pair of horses and a driver, to
draw it for a day or a. short time. The injury for which
the suit was brought was the result of the carelessness of
the driver while the defendant was riding in the carriage.
The plaintiff brought this action against the owner of the
carriage. The judge before whom the case was tried
non-suited the plaintiff, and a strong attempt was made for
a new trial, both in the king's bench and exchequer chamber, which failed, on account of a disagreement among the
judges in both courts as to the question whose servant the
driver was that did the injury-whether, in the act of
driving, he was the servant of the defendant, who was
riding in the carriage, or of the stable-keeper, who sent
him with the horses to draw it. In this case, LITTLEDALE, J., put his opinion that the owner of the carriage
was not liable for the injury done to a third person by the
negligence of the driver, on the ground that the driver
could not be the servant of both the stable-keeper and the
.owner of the carriage; and the learned judge remarked
that the driver " was the servant of one or the other, but
not the servant of one and the other; that the law did not
recognize a several liability in two principals."
Quarman v. Burnett' is the case of Laugher v. Pointer
over again. In that case the defendants, who were the
owners of the carriage, hired a pair of horses from another
person, and a driver to drive them to the carriage for a
short time, during which an injury was done to the plaintiff's horse and chaise by the carelessness of the driver, for
which the owner of the horse and chaise brought his action
against the owners of the carriage. The defendants pleaded
-First, not guilty ; second, that the carriage and horses,
or either of them, was not under the care of the defendants.
16 Mees. & W., 497.
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Upon the trial the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff,
and the judge reserved the right to move to enter a nonsuit. On the decision of this motion Baron PARKE delivered
the opinion of the Court, which was that the defendants
were not liable, and that a rule be made absolute to enter
a verdict for them. In the course of his very able opinion,.
the learned Baron says that, "upon the principle that qui
facilt er aliumfacilterse,the master is responsible for the

acts of his servant; and that person is undoubtedly liable
who stands in the relation of master'to the wrongdoer,he who had selected him as his servant from thd knowledge
of or belief in his skill and care, and who could remove
him for misconduct, and whose orders he was bound to receive and obey. But the liability, by virtue of the relation
of master and servant, must cease when the relation itself
ceases to exist; and no other person than the master of
such servant can be liable, on the simple ground that the
servant is the servant of another, and his act the act of
The decision in Quarman v. Burnett was
another."
approved of and followed in Rapson v. Cubitt,' and in the
case of Reedie v. Railway Co., supra, and in a great many
later English cases; and the doctrine of these cases was
adopted by Judge STORY in his " Commentaries on the
Law of Agency."' And the same principles, especially as
laid down by Lord TENTERDEN and LITTLEDALE, J., in
Laugher v. Pointer, and by Baron PAIRKE, in Quarman v.
Burnett, were recognized and followed by this Court in
Muse v.SteM 3 without any qualification whatever. 4
Milligan v. Wedge,' is another case that powerfully
illustrates the propriety of the rule that exempts an employer from liability for injuries resulting from the carelessness of an independent contractor or his agents or servants,
where the employer has exercised due care in the selection
of a competent and skilful contractor, who employs and
pays his own workmen, who are subject to his orders only,
and who does the work by means and methods of his own
selection. In that case the rule of respondeat superiorwas
2
382 Va.. 33.
(2d Ed.) 453b.
512 Adol. & H., 737.
J.,
in that case.
opinion
of
HINTON,
See

'9 Mees. & W., 709.
4
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fully aid ably considered upon these facts: The defendant,
who was a butcher, had bought a bullock at Smithfield
market, in the city of London, where persons who drive
cattle for others are required to be licensed. The butcher
employed a licensed drover to drive the bullock to the
slaughter-house, which was within the bounds of the city.
-The drover employed a boy to drive the ox, who conducted
the matter so negligently that he permitted the ox, as he
was passing by the plaintiff's show-room, in which he had
marble chimney-pietes, etc., for sale, to run into the showroom and break the chimney-pieces, for which injury the
plaintiff sued the butcher. The judge before whom the
case was tried was of opinion that the boy was not the servant of the defendant. In that case WILLIAMS, J., said:
"The difficulty always is to say whose servant the person
is that does the injury. When you decide that, the question is solved."
In the leading New York case of Blake v. Ferris,' it
was held that, where persons having a license or grant to
construct at their own expense a sewer in a public street,
engage another person to construct at a stipulated price for
the whole work, they are not liable to third persons for any
injury resulting from the negligent manner in which the
sewer may be left at night by the workmen employed in its
construction; that the immediate employer of the agent or
servant through whose negligence an injury occurs is the
person responsible for the negligence of such agent or servant, and that to him the principle respondeal suberiorapplies. In that case, the opinion-a very able one-was delivered by Judge MULLETT, in the course of which he says:
"The rule of res.Pondeal szuerior, as its terms imply, belongs to the relation of superior and subordinate, and is
applicable to that relation wherever it exists, whether between principal and agent or master and servant, and to
the subjects to w'hich that relation extends, and is coextensive with it, and ceases when the relation itself ceases
to exist. It is founded on the power which the superior
has a right to exercise over the acts of his subordinates.
15 N. Y., 48.
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Therefore the rule cannot be applicable to cases where no
such power exists. The absolute and direct coincidence
and co-existence of the rule resfiondeat szqferior with the
relation to which it is applicable, and to the subject-matter
to which that relation extends, is an important proposition
in determining the applicability of the rule;" citing, as illustrations, all the cases above referred to, and adding the
remark that all of these cases are cited with approbation by
Mr. Justice STORY in his "Commentary on Agency."' The
American authorities, holding substantially the same doctrine, are too numerous for convenient citation ;" some of
which will hereinafter be referred to. In fact, we may
safely venture the remark that, upon a careful examination
of -all the authorities, applying to them the tests of right
reason and common justice, and looking at them in the
light of sound, well-settled principles, no well-considered
,case will be found holding a different doctrine. It is not
claimed that there is that uniformity in the decided cases
which is always so much to be considered. On the contrary, there are a number of cases in irreconcilable conflict
with each other and with the cases above referred to; but
the overwhelming weight of authority is in accord with
the cases above referred to. It is safe to say that, while
other causes have contributed to this conflict in the decided
cases, it originated in the erroneous and monstrous, doctrine held in the old English case of Bush v. Steinman,' i n
which A, having a house by the roadside, contracted with
B to repair it for a stipulated sum. B contracted with
C to do the work; C with D to furnish the materials.
The servant of D brought a quartity of line to the house,
and placed it in the road, by which the plaintiff's carriage
was overturned, and he was injured. The Court held that
A, the owner of the house, was answerable for the damage
sustained. Thus the owner of the property, notwithstanding he had let the work to a contractor, w'as held liable for
absurdly remote and inconsequential damage. But for the
authoritative report of the case it could scarcely be believed
1 453, a, b and c.
2 1 Bos. & P., 404.
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that any court of high authority ever made a decision so
utterly opposed to reason and justice. But that case was decided nearly one hundred years ago, when many crude

doctrines were advanced that are now disregarded as unsound, misleading and unjust. The doctrine of that case,
from its inception, met with stern resistance from bench
and bar. In subsequent English cases it was sometimes
urged as the settled law of that country, but was doubted
and avoided by the Englislh judges; in others it was not referred to by either counsel or court; and, finally, after a
somewhat equivocal controversy, iasting some fifty years,
it was entirely overturned and repudiated in the case of
Reedie v. Railway, suiqra; in which Baron ROLFE said
that, "according to the modern decisions, Bush v. Steinman must be taken not to be law; or, at all events, that it
cannot be supported on the ground on which the judgment
of the Court proceeded." The contest was renewed in this
country, and in Hilliard v. Richardson,' in an exceedingly
able opinion by Judge THOMAS, expressing the unanimous
opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, all the
authorities, American and English, were elaborately and
ably reviewed, and the doctrine of Bush v. Steinman was
repudiated out and out, it being demonstrated that the case
promulgated a doctrine which had no existence in England
prior to that decision, and that it was not law in either
England or America; and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the owner of land, who employs a carpenter, for a specific price, to alter and repair -a building
thereon, and to furnish all the materials for this purpose,
is not liable for damages resulting to a third person from
boards deposited in the highway in front of the land by a
teamster in the employ of the carpenter, and intended to be
used in such alteration and repair. This case of Hilliard v.
Richardson is entitled to peculiar weight and influence, not
only by reason of the carefully considered and able opinion
delivered by Judge THOMAS, but because it was decided by

a bench of judges presided over by that eminent jurist,
Chief Justice SHAW.
13 Gray, 349.
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The character of the decisions in conflict with those
above referred to, and the untenable ground upon which
they rest, may be well illustrated by a brief comparisonFirst, of two English cases-Hole v. Railway Co.,' and
Butler v. Hunter

;2

and, second, of two American cases-

Scammon v. City of Chicago,' and City of Chicago v.
Robbins.'
Hole v. Railway Co. was a dase in which the defendant company was authorized by Act of Parliament to
construct a drawbridge across a navigable stream ; the Act
providing that it should not be lawful to detain any vessel
navigating the river for a longer time than was necessary
to enable any carriages, animals or passengers ready to
traverse to cross the bridge, and for opening it to admit
such vessel. The defendant company employed a contractor to construct the bridge, and by some defect in the construction of the draws the bridge could not be opened,
and the plaintiffs vessel was thereby prevented from navigating the river, and the Court held that the defendant
company was liable. The opinion was delivered by POLLOCK, C. B., who,in the course of his opinion, said: "Where
a person is authorized by Act of Parliament, or is bound
by contract to do particular work, he cannot avoid responsibility by contracting with another person to do that
work ;" quoting the remark of Lord CAMPBELL in Ellis v.
Gas Co., sujfra, where it is said: "It is a proposition absolutely untenable that in no case can a man be responsible
for the act of a person with whom he has made a contract.
I am clearly of the opinion that, if the contractor does the
thing which he is employed to do, the employer is responsible for that thing, as if he did it himself." No one will
controvert the accuracy and justness of this remark of Lord
CAMPBELL, for, under the rule above laid down, if a man
employ another to do an unlawfinl act, or an act that isfier
se a nuisance, he, of course, as well as the person who was
employed and did the act, would be liable; otherwise the
act to be done was in itself lawful, and the injury re16 Hurl. & N., 488.
s 25 IIl, 424.

27 Hurl. & N., 825.
42 Black, 418.
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sulted from the carelessness of the contractor of his agents
and servants. But the learned Chief Baron proceeds to
say, in substance, "When the act complained of is purely
collateral, and arises incidentally in the course of the performance of the work, the employer is not liable because
[italics the writer's] he never authorized that act; the remedy is against the ferson who did it. But when the contract is to do a particular act, the doing of which produces
mischief, another doctrine applies."
What other doctrine
is it, we ask, that then applies? None other than what-is
comprehended in any one of the prominent exceptions to
the rule above laid down that exempts an employer, under
certain circumstances, from liability for injuries resulting
from the carelessness of a contractor or his agents or servants; for instance, if the act to be done is in itself unlawful, or if it is fier se a nuisance, or cannot be done without
damage to third persons, then, in either event, the employer is liable, as much so as if he did the act himself.
But POLLOCK, C. B., proceeds to say; "Here the legislature empowered the company to build the bridge. In building that bridge the contractor created an obstruction to the
navigation, and for that the company are liable ....
So
here it was the duty of the company to see how the contractor was about to construct the bridge. They ought to
have taken care to ascertain what he was about to do, what
materials he would use, and to have seen that the specifications and materials were such as would insure the construction of a proper and efficient bridge."
The learned Chief
Baron was, however, careful to add: "But I do not rest my
judgment on*that ground, but simply on this: that there
is a distinction between mischief that is collateral and that
which directly results from the act which the contractor
agreed and was authorized to do." This reasoning is palpably unsound, at variance with the remarks of Lord
CAMPBELL, quoted by the learned Chief Baron, and wholly
inapplicable to the case under consideration. The report
of the case shows that the railway company let the work
to be executed according to the requirements of the Act of
Parliament, and that the injury complained of occurred
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during the erection of the bridge, and before it was completed and turned over to the company. Though the report of the case does not show precisely how it occurred
that the draw failed to open on that occasion, it is quite
likely that for some unforeseen cause there was a
mere temporary obstruction to the navigation, in which
case common fairness would dictate a liberal construction
of the statute in favor of the company, and even the contractor, the bridge being a work of public importance,
superior to the interest of the private ship-owner, whose
vessel was only temporarily detained. But, however this
may have beefi, Chief Baron POLLOCK puts his judgment
upon the distinct but untenable ground that the mischief
was the direct result of doing the thing which the contractor agreed to do and was authorized to do, when, as
before stated, the company let the work to the contractor,
to be executed according to the requirements of the Act of
Parliament. What possible reason or excuse, then, could
there have been for the ruling, which, in effect, held that
the railroad company deliberately employed and authorized
the contractor to do an unlawful act to construct the bridge
so as to obstruct the navigation of the river? And strang6st of all is., that the Chief Baron quotes with approbation
the language of Lord CAMPBELL in Ellis v. Gas Co., supra,

which by no means sustains the conclusion arrived at in
Hole v. Railway Co., the judgment in which cannot possibly be upheld on the ground upon which it was put, nor
upon any now recognized principle or rule of decision. One
.year later the same learned judge, in the same court, decided the case of Butler v. Hunter, suqra, in which, upon
principle, he practically repudiated the doctrine held by
him in the former case. In Butler v. Hunter the defendant employed an architect to repair his house, and it became
necessary to take down and rebuild the front thereof, and
the work was let to a builder. The plaintiff was the owner
of the adjoining premises, between which and the defendant's house there was a party-wall, fourteen inches thick,
and in front of the defendant's house what is called a
"brest-summer,"' one end of which was inserted into the
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party-wall about six inches. In removing the front of the
defendant's house the contractor's workmen removed the
brest-summer, and, not having shored up the plaintiff's
house, the front wall thereof fell, and he was considerably
damaged thereby. It appeared that the work might have
been done with safety if the wall .hadbeen shored up, which
was the ordinary and usual precaution adopted in such
cases, and the Court held that the defendant could not be
held-chargeable. "I think," said POLLOCK, C. B., "that,
as a matter of fact, if a person gives an order to a tradesman to do some work, he means him to do it in the ordinary and tradesman-like way, and the employer has a right
to presume that he will do it in that way; and, if he is
guilty of no negligence in the selection of a contractor, he
cannot be held chargeable because he did not personally
see to.it that the work was done so." In this case, too, the
position was taken and ably argued by the plaintiff's counsel that, inasmuch as injury might result from a careless
execution of the work, the defendant was personally bound
to see to it that such precautions were taken as to prevent
it; but the Court repudiated the doctrine, and held expressly that this duty was only imposed where the injury
was consequent upon doing the work in the ordinary
mode; and such is the rule established by the decisions,
.
both in England and in this-count.---English
cases.
They cannot be
stand
the
two
Thus
reconciled upon principle. They were decided by the
same judge. In the one case he said it was the duty
of the railway company to see how the contractor was
about to construct the bridge; that it was the duty of the
company to ascertain what he was about to do, and what
materials he would use, and to have seen that the specifications and materials were such as would insure the construction of a proper and efficient bridge, though the judgment was put upon an entirely different ground. In the
other case he expressly held and based .his judgment upon
the ground that the work having been let to a contractor,
selected with due care, the employer had a right to presume that the work would be done in the ordinary and
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tradesman-like way; that he was not bound personally to
inquire and see to it how the contractor intended to do or
was, in fact, doing the work-. The language used by POLLOCK, C. B., in Hole v. Railway Co., involves a manifest
absurdity. Railroad companies, for reasons of sound public
policy, are treated as persons-artificial persons-and, except to the extent that they are inhibited by their charters
or the general law, they may contract and be contracted
with, sue and be sued, and in general conduct their affairs
just as natural persons do. Their corporate affairs must,
in the nature of things, be entrusted to the human agencies, and their roads and necessary structures can only
be built and repaired by the same instrumentalities. If,
according to the doctrine held by POLLOCK, C. B., in
Hole v. Railway Co., such a company, after exercising
due care in selecting a competent and skilful contractor,
commits the work to him, and must see to it in person that the work in all its details is so done as to
insure safety, it is at once obvious that a duty is imposed
which cannot possibly be performed. The personal superintendence of the board of directors and all the stockholders combined could but confuse matters and lead to
multiplied mischiefs, because, if not utterly incompetent,
they could never agree among themselves what should be
done, nor how. Must a railroad company have, at every
point along its line of road, where its important structures
are being erected or repaired, not only a competent and
skilful, but an infallible, engineer, to superintend its
independent contractors, and direct and control theni in all
the details of their work? If so, then there is an end to
all independent employment, for no sane man would subject himself to the risks which such an arrangement would
impose, as he could make no safe calculation upon completing with satisfaction to his employer, or with profit to
himself, a work the details of which are subject to the
direction and control of another. In other words, the important and well-recognized distinction between the relation of the contractor and contractee and that of master
and servant would cease to exist, and every contractor, no
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matter how skilful and competent he may be, would
become the mere servant of his employer. Such, in effect,
is what is said by POLhOCK, C. B., in Hole v. Railway Co.,
supra, and is practically what is contended for in the
present case. No such view can be upheld upon either
principle or authority. It can bat be obvious to every impartial mind that when any person, natural or artificial,
and especially the latter, has, in the exercise of due care
and caution, selected a competent and skilful contractor,
and has committed the work to be done to him, at a stipulated price; and to be done in the approved workmanlike
way, and the work be lawful, and such as can be accomplished without injury to third persons if done in the usual
workmanlike way, then the utmost degree of care and
caution has been exercised that can in reason and justice be
required of any employer. This view, of course, is confined to cases like the present, and has no application to
cases of injury to passengers or to employees of a railroad
company, resulting from the negligence of such company;
for, as will be presently more fully shown, in the present
case the relation of master and servant did not exist
betweeia the railroad company and the plaintiff's intestate,
nor was he a passenger on the company's road; so that no
claim to a recovery can be based upon the principles applicable to either of those relations.
Now let us compare the two American cases-Scammon
v. City of Chicago, and City of Chicago v. Robbins-above
referred to. In the first-named case the Supreme Court of
Illinois held, reversing the court below, that an owner of
land, who contracts with a skilful party to erect a building
thereon, and who for that puprose surrenders the premises
for the uses of the contractor, is not, during the erection of
the building, answerable in damages for an accident which
occurs to a stranger passing by ; that, if the sufferer has
any recourse, it is against the contractor, or the corporation
within which the property is situated; that the parties who
may be accused of negligence under such circumstances
are not the servants of the owner of the premises, but of
the contractor. In the other case (City of Chicago v. Rob-
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bins) the Supreme Court of the United States, reversing
the Federal District Court, overruled in part the doctrine
held by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the first-named
case of Scammon v. City of Chicago. The extent to which
the doctrine so held -was disapproved by the Supreme Court
of the United States appears in the opinion of Mr. Justice
DAvIs, where he says, after adverting to the fact that the
defendant's counsel had cited and relied on Hilliard v.
Richardson,' and Scammon v. City of Chicago,2 that
"Hilliard v. Richardson was a most elaborate and able
discussion of the doctrine of resPondeal siperior,and the
authorities in this country and England were fully reviewed,
and we see no reason to question the conclusion at which
the Court arrived. But that case and the one at bar were
not at all alike. That was a case where the owner of a
building contracted with a carpenter, at an agreed sum, to
repair it; and a teamster, who was employed by the carpenter to haul boards, left them in the street in front of the
lot, and an accident happened. The teamster, when he
placed the boards in the street, was engaged in a work collateral to that which the owner contracted for-the repair
of the building-and in no sense can the injury besaid to
happen from the doing of that defectively which the owner
directed to be done. The owner was correctly held not
liable, and one of the grounds on which the Court placed
its decision was, that it was not .a nuisance erected by
the owner of the land or by his license, to the injury of
another." Such is the comment of Mr. Justice DAvIs
on the case of Hilliard v. Richardson, in which he obviously falls far short of recognizing the real scope of the
d~cision, or the principles upon which that decision rests.
He admits it to be a most elaborate and able discussion of
the doctrine of resfiondeal siqerior,in which the authorities in this country and England were carefully reviewed,
and that he saw no reason to question the conclusion
arrived at in that case. But he says that case and the one
he had in hand (City of Chicago v. Robbins) were not at
all alike. Viewed in the light of principle and reaso,,
'3 Gray, 349.
22

225

IIl., 424.
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this is a somewhat remarkable distinction-a distinction
without a difference. In both cases the owner let the work
to independent contractors; in both the mischief resulted
from the carelessness of the servants of the contractors. In
other words, in Hilliard v. Richardson, the contractor, who
had undertaken, at an agreed price, to repair the house of
the contractee, employed a teamster to haul boards, and the
teamster, who was the servant of the contractor, and not of
the owner, left the boards in the street in front of the house,
by reason whereof the mischief occurred. In City of
Chicago v. Robbins-the case Mr. Justice DAVIS was considering-the contractor made, at an agreed price, an excavation or pit in the sidewalk of a public street for area lights,
and his servants left the pit insecurely covered, and the mischief complained of was the result. Now, upon principle,
what conceivable difference is there in the two cases? None
that we can perceive; for, if negligence there was, it was,
in each case, the negligence not of the owner or proprietor,
but of the servant of the contractor, for which the contractor, and not the owner of the property, was liable.
"But," says Mr. Justice DAVIS, "the teamster, when he
placed the boards in the street, was engaged in a work collateral to that which the owner contracted for-the repair
of the building-and in no sense could the injury be said to
result from doing defectively that which the owner directed
to be done;" and the owner was correctly held not liable.
This reasoning is plainly fallacious. If leaving the boards
in the street was a work collateral to that which the owner
let to the contractor, by reason whereof the owner was exempt from liability, the same was essentially true of the act
of the servants of the contractor, in the case Mr. Justice
DAVIS was deciding, in leaving the pit, dug in the street
for area lights, uncovered and unguarded. In each case
a dangerous obstruction was placed in a public street, and
in each the result was injury to a third person. The
obstructions thus created could be said to differ only in degree. But what possible difference could it make to a man
whether an injury received by him was the result of leaving a pile of boards or other material in a public street, or
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was the result of leaving a hole or pit therein for area lights,
uncovered and unguarded? If, on principle, there is any
difference, we fail to perceive it. It is therefore manifest
that, as in each case the mischief resulted from the act of
the servants of the contractor, it necessarily follows that in
each the owner or proprietor should have been held not
liable, as it was not pretended that the work let to contract
in either case was unlawful. And Mr. Justice DAVIS, in
commenting on the case of Scammon v. City of Chicago,
says: "Scammon v. City of Chicago is similar in many of
its facts to the case he had under consideration-City of
And,
Chicago v. Robbins-and is decided differently."
adverting to the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois
in that case, he says: "That Court held, as we do, that if
the 'nuisance necessarily occurs in the ordinary mode of
doing the work, the occupant or owner is liable; but if it
is from the negligence of the contractor or his servants, then
he should alone be responsible.' But the Court also held
that 'the omission to cover the opening in the area did not
necessarily occur as an incident to the prosecution of the
work'-a rule to which we cannot assent, and which we
think is opposed to reason and authority." Thus, in plain
and unequivocal terms, Mr. Justice DAVIS states his only
ground of dissent from the decision in Scammon v. City of
Chicago. It is only that the Illinois Court held that "the
omission to cover the opening in the area did not necessarily occur as an incident to the prosecution of the work;"
and this, and this only, was the ground of dissent. The
ruling dissented from is in exact accord with the numerous
cases hereinbefore referred to and relied upon, and is sound
upon principle, as well as sustained by ample authority.
Upon what conceivable principle, we ask, can it be said
that the negligence of a servant of an independent contractor, in the prosecution of a work which, in itself, is
lawful, is a necessary incident to such work? To hold any
such doctrine would be, in effect, to hold, as was the case
in Hole v. Railway Co., sufira, that to let work to a competent and skilful contractor is, in effect, tantamount to an
assumption on the part of the employer or owner of respon-
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sibility for all injuries resulting from the carelessness of
the contractor, his agents or servants. In other words, it
would be to hold that, in letting to contract a lawful work,
the contractee, owner or proprietor becomes necessarily responsible for every unlawful or careless act done by the
contractor or his servants in the prosecution of such work.
To uphold any such doctrine would be unjust and oppressive, and opposed to both principle and authority.
We have thus compared the two English cases-Hole
v. Railway Co. and Butler v. Hunter. Upon both principle
and authority we feel constrained to reject the doctrine laid
down in the former, and to approve that in the latter case.
So as to the two American cases-Scammon v. City of
Chicago, and City of Chicago v. Robbins-we can but
approve the decision in the former, as resting well on principle and authority, while we reject the latter as opposed to
both. We may safely venture the remark that a careful
examination of all the authorities, American and English,
will show that all the decisions which, like Hole v. Railway Co. and City of Chicago v. Robbins, are opposed to
the conclusion arrived at in the present case, have an
obvious leaning toward the unjust and oppressive doctrine
held in the old English case of Bush v. Steinman, szra,
which was long ago repudiated in both England and this
country.
But in the present case the plaintiff relies with confidence on the case of City of Chicago v. Robbins, supra.
That case, however, can have no application to the case in
hand, as, in addition to what has already been said, the
judgment therein was distinctly placed upon the ground
that the work, which was left unguarded, became a nuisance. In the course of his opinion in that case Mr. Justice
DAvis said: "This area, when it was begun, was a lawful
work and, if properly cared for, it would always have been
lawful; but it was suffered to remain uncovered, and
thereby it became a nuisance, and the owner of the lot, for
whose benefit it was made, is responsible." This is just the
principle upon which the judgment proceeded in Bush v.
Steinman. But however this may be, the language of the
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judge, above quoted, shows that the judgment was put upon
the ground that work, which was lawful in its inception,
became a nuisance, and that upon that -ground the owner
of the property was held liable. It is not pretended, in the
present case, that the work in question was unlawful, or
that, from any cause, it became at any time a nuisance; so
that the case of City of Chicago v. Robbins can have no
application whatever. As was said by Baron ROLFE, in
Hobbitt v. Railway Co., sufira, the wrongful act here could
not in any possible sense be treated as a nuisance. It was
one single act of negligence, and that was the inopportune,
careless act of Englesby, the agent or servant of Smith, the
contractor, in ordering the signal to be given for the train
to pass over the bridge when it was unsafe, when, had he
waited-it may have been a very short time-all would
have been well. But he did not wait, and his grossly
negligent act was the sole cause of the disaster which followed; and for that negligent and careless act, which resulted so fatally to the plaintiff's intestate, Smith, the
contractor, is responsible, and not the railroad company;
for, as between the said contractor and Englesby, his foreman, who was the real author of the mischief, the relation
of principal and agent or master and servant did exist, and
upon the principle quifaclzf5er aliure facidper se, Smith,

the master, is alone responsible. As between Smith, the
contractor and the plaintiff's intestate, Bibb, the relation
of master and servant also existed. Bibb was employed
and paid by Smith, and bound to receive and obey his
orders. He owed no special duty to the railroad company,
nor did the latter owe any such duty to him. The company never by contract, express or implied, undertook to
look after and protect him against injury; nor had he any
right to look to it for the performance of any such duty.
He, the plaintiff's intestate, stood in the shoes of his
master, who was Smith, the contractor; and was entitled,
at the hands of the company, to no other or higher duty
than was due from it to Smith. There is no evidence, nor
is it pretended, that the railroad company was guilty of
negligence or carelessness in the manner of running its
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trains on the bridge, after the signal was given to cross.
On the contrary, it is a fact certified, that the train was
moving at the rate of three or four miles per hour-a rate
of speed not exceeding that of an ordinary pedestrian on a
common country road.
In the light of the facts certified, and the principles of
law applicable thereto, it is obvious that the rule resfiondeat
suferiorhas no application in the present case. The relation of master and servant did not exist between the railroad company and Smith, the contractor, by the negligent
or wrongful act of whose agent or servant the injury was
occasioned. It is, therefore, obvious that in no possible
sense can it be said that the railroad company stood in the
relation of master to either Smith, the contractor, or to his
foreman, Englesby. The facts of this case incontestably
show that Smith was an independent contractor in the
broadest sense of the, term. He was, moreover, an engineer in good standing; that he followed an independent
calling, had had extensive experience in the construction
and erection of iron bridges, and was a professional and
practical bridge-builder of repute, and had recently erected
several important bridges for the defendant company; that
he contracted to build the bridge in question, according to
plans and specifications previously agreed upon; that in its
construction he selected, employed and paid his own workmen, who were subject to his orders only, and he was to
receive a fixed price for the work complete; and that,
while the company's chief-engineer and his assistants had
the right to criticise both the methods and workmanship,
they did not have the right to direct the methods to be
employed by the contractor in the erection of the bridge.
There is, therefore, no possible sense in which it could be
said that the relation of master and servant existed between
the railroad company and the contractor, or between it and
Englesby, the agent or servant of the contractor; and, in
the absence of such relation, there can be no liability on
the company. Yet it is strenuously contended, on behalf
of the plaintiff in error, that Smith was not an independent
contractor, but simply an agent or servant of the railroad
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company, and that the latter is responsible for the negligent and wrongful acts of Smith, his agents or servants, in
the prosecution of the work; it being claimed that it was
the duty of the company to protect the plaintiffs intestate
against the consequences of the negligent and wrongful
acts of Smith, or his agents or servants, by refusing to run
its trains upon the bridge when it was in an incomplete
and dangerous condition, although the signal for the train
to pass over the bridge was given in obedience to the order
of Englesby, Smith's foreman, and in accordance with the
right reserved to Smith in the contract that such signals
should be given by Englesby's orders. This broad proposition embraces all others of minor importance asserted by
the plaintiff in error, and is directly in conflict with the
conclusion at which we have arrived, and with the numerous 'authorities, American and English, cited in support of
that conclusion. The contention is attempted to be upheld
by assuming that the maxim, quifacilperalium faciler
se, and the consequential rule of res2pondea suherior,apply

to the facts of this case. The rule of res1 ondeat suberioris
simple and easily understood, though the decided cases
show much diversity of opinion in its application, which,
it seems, might, to a great extent, have been avoided.
Doubtless, however, this diversity is not traceable to any
intricacy or uncertainty in the rule itself, or to any doubt
of its correctness, but is due to the great variety and intricacy of the facts in respect to which its application has
been invoked, and the yet greater difficulty in determining,
in many cases, whether or not the relation existed to which
the rule is applicable. Hence, in Milligan v. Wedge,
supra, the remarks of WILLIAMS, J., that. "the difficulty
always is to say whose servant the person is that does the
injury. When you decide that, the question is solved."
In applying the rule of residndeal szierior, it is of the
utmost importance that it be not extended beyond the
reason upon which it is founded. By the plain import of
its terms the rule belongs to the relation of superior and
subordinate, and is applicable to that relation wherever it
exists, whether between principal and agent or master and
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servant; and where that relation does not exist there can
be no ground for the application of the rule. In the
present case it has been shown beyond question that the
person who occasioned the injury was the agent or servant
of the contractor, and not of the railroad company, and
that the latter cannot, in reason or justice, be held liable.
The proposition that, in the present case, Smith was
not an independent contractor, but simply the agent or servant of the company, rests on several grounds of contention. Let us now briefly examine them.
i. It is contended that the right reserved by the railroad company to run its trains over the bridge during its
construction destroyed the independency of the contractor's
employment. Under the circumstances of this and like
cases, this proposition is without the sanction of either
reason or authority, and must be rejected, as opposed not
only to reason- and justice, but to sound legal principles,
almost, if not quite, universally recognized. The obvious
vice, that lies at the very root of the contention, is that it
ignores the indisputable fact that Smith was an independent contractor, employed and paid his own workmen, who
were subject to his orders only, and that he stipulated for
and was to receive a fixed price for the work complete; ignores the plain and universally recognized distinction between the relation of contractor and contractee and that of
principal and agent or master and servant, and rests solely
upon the moral assumption that the reservation by the
owner or proprietor of any use or enjoyment whatever of
the property on which the work let to contract is to be done
necessarily destroys the independency of the contractor's
employment. In other words, that a railroad company or
private individual cannot, in one case, build its road or
other structures, or repair either; and, in the other, the
owner of property cannot build a house thereon, or repair one, by the intervention of an independent contractor,
without the entire surrender of the possession and use of
the property to such contractor; and that, if such surrender
be not made, then the employer is liable for any injury to
another resulting from the negligent or tortious act of any
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agent or servant of the contractor. The recognition of any
such principle would fiot only lead to the most absurd results, but would be to foster gross injustice and oppression.
The fallacy of the proposition is well illustrated by an incident that occurred during the argument of the case of
Reede v. Railway Co,, suira, when PLATT, B., put to
counsel the following question: "Suppose the occupier of
a house were to direct a bricklayer to make certain repairs
to it, and one of his workmen, through his carelessness,
were to let a brick fall upon a passer-by, is the owner
This was a very pertinent question, and the deliable?"
cision of that case answered it in the negative. In every
such case the question is nbt whether the owner or proprietor retained any use of the property during the erection of
the work, but who had the efficient control of the work to
be done. Such control, in cases like the present, is necessarily with the contractor; and, were it otherwise, independent employment would be degraded, its reliability in
a great measure destroyed, and the general efficiency of
Hence the
railroad service correspondingly impaired.
books teem with decided cases in which defendants were
held not liable for torts committed on their premises by
contractors or their agents or servants, although there had
not been an entire surrender of the possession of the premises
to the contractor. Such was the case in De Forrest v.
Wright,' where a grocer hired a drayman to haul salt to his
store; in Forsyth v. Hooper, ii Allen, 419, where a bellfounder employed a person to hoist some bells into a church.2
In point of fact, the proposition contended for rests, in effect,
upon the unwarranted assumption that the contractor's foreman, Englesby, whose negligent act caused the injury,
had at one and the same time two masters-the railroad
company and Smith, the contractor. The proposition that
the rule of resfiondeal sufierior is applicable only to the
immediate superior of the person who does the injury, and
that there can be but one responsible superior, was clearly
Mich., 368.
See, also, Harrison v. Collins, 86 Pa. St., 153, and McCarthy v. Second Parish of Portland, 71 Me., 318.
22
2
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recognized in the leading cases of Reedie v. Railway Co.,
and Blake v. Perris, supra. Ii Laugher v. Pointer, supra,
LITTLEDALE, J., puts his opinion that the owner of the
carriage was not liable for the injury to a third person by
the negligent driving of the servant of the stable-keeper
expressly on the ground that the driver could not be the
servant of both the livery stable-keeper and the person
riding in the cafriage ; and he added that he "was the servant of the one or the other, but not the servant of one and
the other; that the law did not recognize a several liability
in two
2. principals."
It is contended that the defendant company,
in its
contract with Smith, reserved a *degreeof control over the
work to be erected, which is inconsistent with the idea that
Smith was an independent contractor. This contention
cannot prevail.

In Thomp. Neg., p. 913, it is said: "The

mere fact that the proprietor retains a general supervision
over the work, for the purpose of satisfying himself that
the contractor carries out the stipulations of his contract,
does not make him responsible for wrongs done to third
persons in the prosecution of the work; as, where a railway company employs an engineer to superintend the progress of the construction of its road, and to see that the
work is done according to the contract." The author then
cites, fier contra, the case of Schwartz v. Gilmore,' and
adds: "This, however, is not the sound view of the usual
building contract. The contractor stipulates to deliver to
the proprietor certain results. He is responsible to the proprietor for these only. The proprietor does not retain control over the conltractor as to his methods of proceeding
with the work. He could not do so; for the contractor is
generally skilled in the business, and he is not. No contractor- could safely stipulate to do a job at a fixed price,
and then allow the proprietor to control him in matters of
method and detail; for this might destroy his power so to
order the work as to make his contract a profitable one."
" Accordingly it has been held that a contract between a
municipal corporation and a contractor for the construction
145 IM., 455.
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of a sewer, containing the provision, 'all work to be commenced and carried on at such times and such places, and in
such manner, as the engineer shall direct,' and requiring the
contractor to dismiss from his employment all incompetent
and unfaithful persons, did not reduce the contractor to
the grade of a servant of the city, and make it answerable
for his negligence."' These views are sustained by a great
number of well-consialered cases, only a few of which, in
addition to those already referred to, need be cited.2 The
last-named case is a complete refutation of the claim in the
present case that the right of inspection carried with it the
duty of rejecting all improper workmanship. In that case
the defendant, the owner of an iron mine, contracted with
certain persons to work it, but stipulated that the contractors, and not the owners, should be responsible for any
injuries to workmen; and the responsibility was assumed
by the contractors. The mine was in proper condition
when the contractors took possession; but the contract contained a stipulation that when the contractors repaired the
mine it should be done under the supervision, advice and
control of the defendant's superintendent. In delivering
the opinion of the Court and commenting on this provision, Judge COOLEY, among other things, said: " But the
supervision does not make the owner principal in the mine
or master in the working of it. The owner assumes toward
no one the duty to supervise. He does not stipulate to
supervise; he only contracts for a privilege. If the mine
owner in this case had dismissed the superintendent, and
sent no one to inspect the working, no miner could complain that a duty owing to him was being neglected. The
company had not promised to protect him or to indemnify
ISee Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Pa. St., 247; Hunt v. Railroad Co., 51 Pa.
St., 475; Shear & R. Neg., N 78-81. See, also, Pack v. Mayor, 8 N. Y.,
227, and Kelly v. Mayor, ii N. Y., 432, which strongly sustain the same
view.
2
See Reedie v. Railway Co., sufira; Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo., 121;
Callahan v. Railroad Co., 23 Iowa, 562; Allen v. Willard, 57 Pa. St., 374;
Cuff v. Railroad Co., 35 N.J. Law, 17; ]Eaton v. Railway Co., 59 Me.,
520; Tibbetts v. Railroad Co., 62 Me., 437; Samuelson v. Mining Co., 49
Mich., 164; 13 N. W. Rep., 499.
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him for injuries. On the contrary, it had expressly stipulated that it would assume no such responsibility. The
privilege of intervention for its own protection was
reserved, but the neglect of one's own interest is no wrong
to others. Legal wrongs ifiust spring from neglect of
legal duties;" citing, as in point, Reedie v. Railway Co.,'
before referred to. This view of Judge COOLEiY is peculiarly appropriate to the case in hand, so much so that
comment is unnecessary. The injury in that case was to
an employee of the contractors, and the same is true in the
present case. But in this case it is a singular fact that,
while it is assumed that Englesby, whose negligent and
careless act caused the injury, was the servant of the railroad company, yet every authority relied upon presents the
case of an injury to a third person ; not a single case is
cited by the plaintiff in which the injury was to an employee of the contractor. Obviously, if, as insisted, the
railroad company owed to the plaintiff's intestate the duty
of protecting him against injury, it could be on no other
ground than that the relation of master and servant existed
between them ; but it is perfectly clear that no such relation existed. It is equally clear that, as the servant of
Smith, the plaintiffis intestate did stand in the relation of
servant to him, and as the second person in the contract for
services to be rendered by him. It is clear, therefore, that
the plaintifi's intestate was not a third person or stranger,
either in respect to the railroad company or Smith,
the contractor, but was simply one of two persons to the
contract for service between the contractor and himself.
Hence the authorities respecting injuries to third persons
can have no application to this case. There was no contract relation, express or implied, between the railroad
company and the employees of the contractor, or either of
them; and, as between said company and the plaintift's
intestate there was no relation whatever, other than that
which springs from the common bond of society, as expressed in the maxim, sic uteri tuo ut alienum non iwdas,
which imposes upon .every man the duty of so using his
14 Exch., 244.
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own as to do no injury to his fellow-man.

It can in no

just sense be said that the railroad company violated this
rule, for it is not even pretended that the injury was the"
result of the careless manner in which the company ran its
train on the bridge. On the contrary, it is certified that
the company exercised due care in the selection of the
material furnished, and that it was sufficient for the purposes for which it was intended; that the bridge gave way
and fell because the sway braces, lateral braces and struts
had not been put in position. And it clearly appears that
the niischief was the result of the wrongful act of
Englesby, the contractor's agent or servant, in ordering
the signal for the train to pass in the then insecure condition of the bridge.
3. And it is also contended that there was an obligation imposed by law upon the railroad company to see that
its track was safe, and that it cannot shift this obligation
upon an independent contractor. If the plaintifiPs intestate
had been either a passenger on the ill-fated train or an employee of the company, then this insistence would have
some show of reason; but he was neither, and he cannot
avail himself of the principles applicable in either class of
cases.
4. But, among other things, it is certified that to run
a train of coal cars upon such a bridge, in such a condition,
would be foolhardy; and this is fastened upon as a conclusive reason for holding the railroad company liable, and
upon the express ground that the defective and unsafe condition of the bridge was open and obvious, and could or
ought to have been seen by the company's assistant
engineer, Maj. Goodwin, who was on the ground at the
time or just before the accident, and only three minutes
before had left the bridge, passed to the rear of the train,
and was in the act of mounting on to the caboose to return
to Lynchburg, when he heard the crash and desisted. Is
it credible that he would thus have imperilled his life by
attempting to ride over the bridge in the caboose attached
to the very train under which the bridge fell if the danger
was open to common observation? We think not. The
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question whether the span which fell was, in any particular
stage of its progress, safe, was, in the nature of things, one
to be determined by Smith or his foreman, Englesby, by
whom he acted. This is well illustrated by the correspondence between the parties, leading up to the contract in
question. In a letter written by Smith to Chief Engineer
Coe, dated Baltimore, December 9, 1886, he says: "Replying to yours of the ist inst., I write that, during my late
absence at St. Louis, etc., my best draughtsman worked
out the drawings for the removal of Big Otter bridge; and
when I came to checking them up, within a fevi days,
I found that the premises assumed were a little out,
and a new study is required. This will probably delay
matters a few days," etc. Now, was it competent for
the asSitant engineer, Maj. Goodwin, to interfere -and
delay the work until he could study the situation upon
some theory of his own? Certainly not; for, in the first
place, he had no such right under the terms of the contract; and, in the second place, any such interference could
only have produced confusion and delay, and would have
tended to involve his company in liability not contemplated
by the contracting parties. It is clear that the danger was
not open to common observation, and that the plaintiff's
case has no support in the fact that it was foolhardy to run
the train on the bridge in its insecure condition.

The con-

tractor, acting by his foreman, knew, or ought to have
known, the condition of the bridge. He reserved, for his
protection, the right to have the signals for the passage of
trains given when his foreman, Englesby, so ordered. The
signal was given in obedience to Englesby's orders. The
bridge was then unsafe, hence the disaster that followed, and

for it the contractor, Smith, is alone liable. This case has
been argued for the plaintiff very much as if the plaintiff's
intestate was a common day-laborer, and, in the simplicity
of his nature, trusted to the railroad company for protection. The facts certified warrant no such conclusion, but
quite the contrary. In a telegram to Chief Engineer Coe,
dated Baltimore, January 13, 1887, Smith says: "Foreman

reports James River bridge finished, and he awaiting or-
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ders with his gang at Lynchburg. Shall I order them up
to Otter or Ivy Creek at once?" On the next day he says
to Engineer Coe: "I will send Englesby and gang to Harrisonburg if you decide to postpone the trestling as suggested." On another occasion he spoke of them as "my
erectors." Now, considering the character of work in
which Smith was engaged, in connection with the terms
used in respect to his workmen, such as "EUnglesby and
his gang," and "my erectors," the reasonable inference is that the plaintiff's intestate was one of the
gang -one

of the erectors-

and

that they were all

trained hands in the art of'bridge erection. It may be
stated in general that companies constructing railroads
and cities constructing public works, in the performance
of corporate duties, have again and again been held exempt from liability for the negligence of contractors and
sub-contractors or their agents or servants. In addition to
the authorities already referred to in support of this proposition, only a few more need be cited.' In the last-named
case it was held : (I)That a railroad company, which had
let by contract the entire work of constructing its road, and
had no control over those employed in the work, was not
liable for injuries to a third person, occasioned by the negligent acts of those employed in doing the work, such as
blasting in a manner to throw rocks upon the land
of another. (2) That a party is not chargeable with
the negligent acts of another in doing the work upon
his lands, unless he stands in the character of employer to the one guilty of the negligence, or unless
the work as authorized by him would necessarily produce
the injuries complained of, or they are occasioned
by the omission of some duty incumbent upon him.
(3)That there is no distinction in this respect between an
'See King v.Railroad Co., 66 N. Y., z82; Gorham v.Gross, x25 Mass.,
Cunningham v. Railroad Co., 51 Tex., 5o3; Painter v. Mayor, etc.,
46 Pa. St., 221; Steel v. Railroad Co., 16 C. B., 550; Clark v. Railroad, 28
Vt., 1o3 ; Pawlett v.Railroad Co., Id., 297 ; Callahan v. Railroad Co., 23
Iowa, 562; Cuff v. Railroad Co., 35 N. J. Law, I7; 'Vest v. Railroad Co.,
63 Ill., 545 ; Tibbets v. Railroad Co, 62 le., 437; MeCafferty v. Railroad
Co, 61 N. Y., 178.
232;
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owner 6f real and of personal property, and the former is
held to no stricter liability for the negligent use and management of his real estate, or of negligent acts upon it by
others, than is the latter as to a similar use of his property.
Such is the true doctrine, and we adopt it as the only doctrine justly applicable to the present and all similar cases.
There is, therefore, no just ground upon which the plaintiff
in error, the plaintiff below, can base a tight of recovery in
the present case. We are of opinion that there is no error
in the judgment of the Court below. As all other questions
raised are dependent upon that raised by the plaintiff's first
and most material bill of exceptions, which has been very
fully considered, and as the determination thereof on the
.fadts and law of the case will probably operate as a final
disposition of the case itself, we deem it unnecessary to
consider the questions raised by other exceptions of minor
importance. The judgment of the Court below is correct,
and must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
LIABILITY OF THE. EMPLOYER FOR THE TORTSOF AN
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
I. When an employer has placed
the execution of a specified work in
the hands of a competent and trustworthy workman, yielding up to
him the entire possession and control of the premises where it is to be
carried on, and reserving to himself
no direction or control over the
manner in which it is to be executed, he will generally not be liable
to the servants of the contractor, or
to a stranger, for any injury which
may happen through the negligence
or wrongdoing of the contractor or
his servants. The rule of respondeal superiorhas no application to
such a case; for the contractor is
in no sense the servant of the employer, except as to the results of
the work. The manner of executing it is his own, and cannot be

imputed to the employer; and if
that manner of execution produce
a faulty result, the employer is not
bound to accept it. Until acceptance or ratification of the contractor's acts, then,the employer cannot
be held responsible for them. This
distinction was formerly doubted;
and Bush v. Steinman, i Bos. & P.,
4o4, ruled that the employer was
liable for the, negligence of not
merely a contractor, but for that of
the servant of a sub-sub-contractor.
Chief Justice Eypv very naturally
had some doubts about it, and declared that he could not state the
precise principle on which the action was founded; and his doubts
have since been amply justified.
Although Bush v. Steinman was
followed in some early English and
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iro); Hackett v. West. Un. Tel.
American cases, it has long ago
Co., 49 N. W., 822; Haley v. Lumbeen completely cast aside, and the
ber Co., 51 N. W., 321; Charlebois
rule abovestated is supported by an
v. R.R., 51 N. V., 812; R. R. V.
overwhelming weight of authority:
McConnell, 13 S. E., 828; R. R. v.
Forsyth v. Hooper, nI Allen(Mass.),
Kimberley, 13 S. B., 277; Long v.
419; Kimball v. Cushman, 1O3
Moon, 17 -S.W., 81o; Duncan v.
Mass., 194; Pack v. N. Y., 8 N. Y.,
Findlater, 6 Cl. & Fin., 894; Rap222; Vanderpool v. Coit, 28 Barb.
(N. Y.), 196; Young v. N. Y. Cent. son v. Cubitt, 9 M..& W., 71o; Hall
R. R., 30 Barb., 229; Benedict v. v. Smith, 2 Bing., 156; Alles v. HayMartin, 36 Barb., 288; Van Wert v. ward, 7 Q. B., 960; Knight v. Fox,
Brooklyn, 28 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 451;
5 Exch., 721; Richmond v. Rusell,
22 Sc. Jur., 394; Peach v. Rowland,
Ryder v. Thomas, 13 Hun (N. Y.),
296; Martin v. Tribune Assp., 30
13 C. B., 182; Gayford v. Nichols,
Hun, 391; Wiener v. Hammell, X4 9 Exch., 702; Holliday v. St. LeonN.Y. Suppl., 365; Meighan v. Hol- ard, iI C. B. N. S., 192; Gilbert v.
lister, -17 N. Y. Suppl.,.XSO; Lind- Halpin, 3 Ir. Jur. N. S., 300; Normile v. Braby, 4 F. & F., 962; Insay v. Singer Mfg. Co., 4 Mo. App.,
nocent v. Peto, 4 F. & F., 8. A
57o; McKinley v. Chic., S. F. & Cal.
Ry. Co., 40 Mo. App., 449; Yerger forlior the same rule gpverns the
v. Watson, 7 Casey, 319; Reed v. case of the liability of the employer
Allegheny, 79 Pa., 3oo; Smith v. and the contractor for the negliSimmons, 1O3 Pa., 32; R. St. Louis gence and torts of a sub-contractor
v. Giblin, 3 Il. App., 219; Scammon or his servants: Blake v. Ferris, 5
438; West v. St. N. Y., 48; Slater v. Mersereau, 64
v. Chicago, 25 Ill.,
N. Y., 138; Vray v. Evans, 8o Pa.,
L., V. & T. H. R. R., 63 III., 545;
102 ; Scarborough v. R. R., io So.,
Kepperly v. Ramsden, 83 Ill., 354;
Aston v. Nolan, 63 Cal., 269; Pey- 316; Butler v. Hunter, 7 H. & N.,
826; Overton v. Freeman, ii C. B.,
ton v. Richards, iI La. An., 62;
867; Pearson v. Cox, 2 C. P. Div.,
Gallagher v. S. W. Expos. Asso.,
28 La. An., 943; Pawlet v. Rut. & 369.
II. Who is an independent conWash. R. R., 28 Vt., 297; Bailey v.
tractor? Many rules have been
Troy & Bost. R. R., 57 Vt., 252;
Wright v. Holbrook, 52 N. H., 120; laid down for the decision of this
Carter v. Berlin Mills, 58 N. H., question. It has been said that the
test of an independent contractor is
62; Clark v. Han. & St. J. R. R.,
36 Mo., 202; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 the right to select, employ and conIowa, 575; WValtemeyer v. R. R., 71 trol the action of the workmen:
Clare v. Nat. City Bank, 40 N. Y.
Iowa, 626; R. R. v. Willis, 38 Kas.,
Super. Ct., 1O4; Hale v. Johnson, 8o
330; Conlin v. Charleston, 15 Rich.
Ill. App., 185; Bennett v. TrueS. C. L., 2bi; Holt v. XVhatley, 51
body, 66 Cal., 5o9. That an indeAla., 569; Meyer v. Mid. Pac. R. R.,
pendent contractor is one who is
2 Neb., 319; Hitte v. Rep. Val. R. R.
Co., 19 Neb., 620; N. 0. & N. E. R. subject to the control of his employer as to the results of his work
R. v. Reese, 61 Miss., 581; Pierce v.
only: Knoxville Iron Co. v. DobO'Keefe, ii XVis., i8o; Rome &
son, 7 Lea (Tenn.), 367; 2 Thom.
Dec'. R. R. v. Chasteen, 88 Ala.,
Neg., 899, p. 22. That the test is
591; Hughes v. R. R., 39 Ohio St,
whether the employer retains the
466 (S. C. 15 A. & . R. R. Cas.,
23
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power of directing and controlling
the work: Andrews v. Boedecker,
17 111. App., 213; Chic. City Ry. v.
Hennessey, i6 Ill. App., 153; Wilson v. White, 71 Ga., 5o6. But
these tests are only partial; and
the best definition is that given in
Powell v. Va. Constr. Co., 88 Tenn.,
692: "An independent contractor
is one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a
piece of work according to his own
-methods and without being subject
to control of his employer, except
as to the result of his work." This
includes all the others, and adds
the additional requisite, that the
contractor must be engaged in an
independent employment
That
this is a necessary qualification is
apparent from the fact that most
servants are left very much to the
freedom of their own will in the
performance of their several tasks,
and that very many, especially corporate servants, are left to select
their workmen. The other rules
would narrow the liability of the
employer to a very small compass.
In accordance with the rule stated
above, any one who follows a recognized independent employment, as
that of a slater, McCarthy v. 2d
Parish of Portland, 71 Maine, 318;
a builder, Robinson v. Webb, ii
Bush (K y.), 464; a manufacturer
of shingles, Whitney v. Clifford, 46
Wis., 138; State v. Emerson, 72
Maine, 455; an architect, Dedford
v. State, 3o Md., I79; a horse-trainer,
Arasmith v. Temple, i i Bradw., 39;
a plumber, Meany v. Abbott, 6
Phila., 256; a licensed drover, Milligan -. Wedge, 12 Ad. & Bl., 737 ;
a licensed public carman, McMullan v. Hoyt, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 271 ;
a licensed public drayman, DeForest v.Wright,' 2 Mich., 3 6S; and
a stevedore, Riley v. Steamship Co.,

La. An., 791; Burke v. Sugar
Ref. Co., ii Hun (N. Y.), 354;
Dwyer v. Steamship Co., 17 Blatchf.
C. Ct., 472 ; The Rhebla, 19 Fed.
Rep., 926; Linton v. Smith, 8 Gray
(Mass.), 147; Hass v. Steamship
Co., 88 Pa., 269; Murray v. Currie,
6 L. R. C. P., 24; Blaikie v. Stembridge, 6 C. B. N. S., 894; is t6 be
regarded as an independent contractor. But a yet broader rule is
given in Hexamer v. Webb, ioi N.
V., 377: "Where a person is employed to perform a certain kind of
work, in the nature of repairs or
improvements to a building, by the
owner thereof, which requires the
exercise of skill and judgment as a
mechanic, the execution of which
is left entirely to his discretion,
without any restriction as to its
exercise, and no limitation as to the
authority conferred in respect to
the same, and no provision is especially made as to the time in which
the work is to be done, or as to the
payment for the services rendered,
and the compensation is dependent
upon the value thereof, such person does not occupy the relation of
a servant under the control of the
master, but is an independent
contractor."
This has much to
commend it; and it will go far to
reconcile the apparently conflicting
cases upon the subject:. Brackett v.
Lubke, 4 Allen (Mass.); 138; Conners v. Hennessey, 112 Mass., 96;
Hunt v. Pa. R. R., 5T Pa., 475;
Raukin v. Transp. Co., 73 Ga., 229;
Fink v. Furnace Co., 82. Mo., 276 ;
Mayhew v. Mining Co., 76 Maine,
ioo; Dillon v. Sixth Ave. R. R. Co.,
48 N. Y. Super. Ct., 283;- Schuler
v. Hudson R. R. R., 38 Barb. (N.
Y.), 653; Corbin v. Am. Mills, 27
Conn., 274; Potter v. Seymour, 4
Bosw. (N. Y.), 140; Devlin v. Smith,
89 N. Y., 470; Darmstaetler v. Moy29
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nahan, 27 Mich., 188; Tiffin v. 66 How. Br. (N. Y.), 35; Laugher V.
Pointer, 5 B. & C., 560; Quarman v.
McCormack, 34 Ohio St., 638;
Burnett, 6 M. & W:, 497. It is now
Glickauf v. Maurer, 75 Ill., 289;
fullyestablished that the general serMorgan v. Bowman, 22 Mo., 538;
Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich., i65; R. vant of one party may become the
R. v. Reese, 6i Miss., 581; Mumby servant of another for a special service, and while engaged in that serv. Bowdenj 6 So., 453; Mill v. Cooper, 30 N. E., 294; Smith v. Bel- vice he is to be considered as the
shaw, 26 Pac. 834; McKeon v. servant of the latter: Murphy v.
Caralli, 3 H. & C., 461; Murray v.
Bolton, i Ir. C. L. Rep., 377; Sadler
v. Henlock, 4 B1. & BI:, 570; Johns- Currie, 6 L. R. C. P., 24; Rourke v.
White Moss Colliery Co., i C. P. D.,
ton v. Hastie, 30 Up. Can. Q. B.,
23;; Beadleson v. Murray, 8 Ad. & 556 (S. C. 2 C. P:D., 205). When a
railroad company agrees to furnish
Fl., ro9; %Voodv. Cobb, 13 Allen
its contractors with motive power,
86
(Mass.), 58; Harrison v. Collins,
and provides them with construction
Pa., z53; Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97
managed by its servants,
trains,
N. Y., 507; Wiggett v. Fox, ii
who are kept on the pay-roll of the
Exch., 832; Johnson v. Lindsay
company, but who are wholly sub'(I89I), App. Cas., 37i. Themodeof
payndent, and the fact that materi- ject to the control of -the contractors, they are to be regarded as the
als are furnished by the employer,
servants of the contractors: Miller
although entitled to consideration,
v. Minn. & N. W. Ry. Co., 76 Iowa,
have but little weight in determining whether or not the employee is 655 (S. C.39, N. W., 188); New Or.,
Baton Rouge, Vicks. & Mem. R. R.
an independent contractor: R. R.
v. Norwood, 62 Miss., 565; Powell
v. Reese, 61 Miss., 58r; Fuller v.
v. Va. Constr. Co., 88 Tenn., 692.
Bank, 15 Fed. Rep., 875; Harrison
Contra: Coyle v. Pierrepont, 37
v. Collins, 86 Pa., 153; Mansfield
Co. v. McEnery, 91 Pa. 18 5 ; R. R.
Hun. (N. Y.), 379; Burton v. R. R.,
v. Grant, 46 Ga., 417; Hexamer v. 61 Tex., 526. Of course, when a
Webb, 1OI N. Y., 377. It may be servant of the contractor is injured
added, that if the contractor, by his by the negligence of a servant of
conduct, induces another to believe the railroad, he can recover against
that a sub-contractor is his servant,
the latter: Young v. N. Y. Cent.
R. R., 3o Barb. (N. Y.), 229; Turner
he will be estopped from denying
v. Gt. Eastern Ry. Co., 33 L. T. N.
that relation in a suit brought
S., 431.
against him for the. negligence
III. There are-two classes of exof the sub-contractor: Johnson v.
ceptions. to the general rule. The
Owen, 33 Iowa, 512.
It sometimes becomes an impor- first consists of those in which the
employer has, by his interference
tant question as to who is responsible for the acts of the general ser- with the operations of the contracvants of one party who are at the tor, by directions or otherwise, or
time in the service of another. The by the reservation of powers in the
contract, nullified his independence
general rule is, that where a person
is under the entire direction and and reduced him to the level of a
mere servant. Thus, although, as
control of another, he is to be conhas been said, the employer is not
sidered as his servant, no matter
liable for the independent acts of a
who pays him: Ditberner v. Rogers,
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"contractor, yet if he actively interferes with or directs the work, in
person or by agent, he will be responsible for any injury which may
be caused by it: Lowell v. R. R.,
23 Pick. (Mass.), 24; Linnahan v.
Rollins, 137 Mass., 123; Erie v.
Caulkins, 85 Pa., 247; Ardesco Oil
Co. v. Gilson, 63 Pa., 146; Nevins
v. Peoria, 41 Ill., 502 ; Palmer v.
Lincoln, 5 Neb., r36; Samyn v. McCloskey, 2 Ohio St., 536; Campbell
v. Lunsford, 3 So., 522; Chic., K. &
West. R. R. v. Watkins, 43 Kans.,
50; Hefferman v. Benkard, I Robt.
(N. Y.), 432 ; Gourdier v. Cormack,
2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 254; Lacour
v. N. Y., 3 Duer (N. Y.), 406; Jones
v. Liverpool, 14 Q. B. D., 89o;
Murphy v. Ottawa, 13 Ont. 334;
Jones v.Chantry, 4 T. & C. (N. Y.),
63; Johnston v. Hastie, 3o Up. Can.
P. B., 232; Mumby v. Bowden, 6
So., 453. The rule of the civil law
is the same: S(randat v. Saisse, I
L. R. P. C., 152, and authorities
there cited. It must be shown,
however, that the directions or interference of the employer, not the
negligence of the contractor or his
servants, was the cause of the injury. Palmer v. Lincoln, 5 Neb.,
136; Callahan v. Burl. & Miss. R.
R., 23 Iowa, 562.
The employer is also liable, if the
contract reserves to him such a
power of supervision or control of
the work as will destroy the free
agency of the contractor, whether
this supervision be exercised by
himself, or by persons designated
by him: Pack v. N.Y., 8 N. Y.,
222; Kelly v. N. Y., ii N. Y., 432;
Vogel v. Mayor, 92 N. Y., IO;
Hughes v. R. R., 39 Ohio St., 466;
Allen v. Villard, 57 Pa., 374; Erie
v.Caulkins, 85 Pa., 274; School Dist.
v. Fuess, 98 Pa., 6oo; Edmundson
v. R. R., III Pa., 316; McMasters

v. R. R., 3Pitts., 1; Gas Co. v. Wilkinson, I Cent. Rep., 637; R. R. v.
Hanning, I5 Wall, 649; Cindinuati
v. Stone, 5 Ohio St., 38; Harper v.
Milwaukee, 30 Wis., 365; Chambers
v. Co., I Dis. (Ohio), 327; Hannon
v. County of St. Louis, 62 Mo., 3i3;
Chicago v. Joney, 6o Ill., 383; Chicago v. Dermody, 6i Ill., 431; Hart
v. Ryan, 6 N. Y. Suppl., 92r; Camp
v. Church Wardens, 7 La. Ann.,
321; Denver v. Rhodes, 9 Col., 554;
Seattle v. Busby, 3 Pac., i8o; Faren
v. Sellers, 3 So., 363; Burgess v.
Gray, I C. B., 578; Blake v. Thirst,
2 H. & C., 20; Brown v. Co., 3 H_
& C., 511; Sack v. Ford, 13 C. B. N.
S., go; Dalton v. Bachelor, x F. &
F., 15 & 17; Stephen v. Com'r's, 3
Ct. of Sess., Cas. 4th Ser., 535;
Steel v. R. R., 16 C. B., 550;
Schwartz v. Gilmore, 45 Ill., 455.
When a contract provides that all
work shall be done under the direction and constant supervision of the
engineer of the railroad, and thedamage complained of was caused,
by excavations outside of the right
of way, which the engineer could
have prevented, the railroad is liable: Bechnel v. N. 0., Mob. &
Tex. R. R., 28 La. Ann., 522. When
a railroad keeps possession of itsroad for the purpose of running
trains and conveying passengers, it
is bound to see that its track isguarded against obstructions, and
is liable for any injury caused by
an obstruction made by the servants
of a contractor: Va. Cent. R. R. v.
Sanger, 15 Gratt. (Va.), 230. An
undertaking by the employer to
furnish necessarymaterialwill make
him liable for an injury due to his
failure to provide it: Gilbert v.
Beach, 5 Bosw. (N. Y.), 447. When
a mining company, entering into a.
contract for work to be done in its
mine, reserves the right to make
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such arrangements as shall be necessary to protect the workmen, it
will be liable for all injuries that
are not due to their contributory
negligence: Lake Sup. Iron Co. %,.
Erickson, .39 Mich., 492; Kelly v.
Howell, 41 Ohio St., 438.
But the employer will not be liable, if the power of supervision
reserved is not such as to interfere
with the discretion of the contractor in the manner of executing the
work, but is confined to seeing that
the intended result is produced:
Nevins v. Peoria, 41 Ill., 502; Gardner v. Bennett, 38 N.Y. Super. Ct.,
197; Vincennes Water Sup. Co. v.
White, 124 Ind., 376; Robinson v.
Webb, ii Bush. (Ky.), 464; Clare v.
Bk., 4oN. Y. Super. Ct., io4. If the
person entrusted with the supervision of the work fails to see that it
is properly performed, his employer
is not to be charged with his breach
of duty: Chambers v. Ohio L. I. &
T. Co., i Dis. (Ohio), 327. The fact
that the employer has specified the
materials to be used does not make
him liable to one injured by a machine which the contractor has procured for his own benefit: Chic.
City Ry. v. Hennessey, 16 Ill. App.,
153. When the employer reserves
a right to annul the contract, if the
contractors do not employ men and
materials to the satisfaction of the
chief-engineer, it does not neces-

sarily make the contractor the servant of the employer: Burmeister
v. N. Y. El. R. R., 47 N. Y., Super.
Ct., 264. A provision in the con-

tract that the chief-engineer of the
company should supervise the work,
and should have power to direct
the discharge of any laborer employed by the contractors who is in
his opinion incompetent, does not
so interfere with the freedom of the
contractors as to make them the

servants of the c6mpany: McKinley v. Chic. S. F. & Cal. R. R., 4o
Mo. App., 449; Rogers v. Florence
R. R., 9 S. E., IO59; Blumb v. Kansas, 84 Mo., ii2; Clark v. R. R., 36
Mo., 202; Eaton v. R. R., 59 Me.,
520.

The employer will also be liable

for an injury caused by a defect in
the contract work, after it has been
finished by the contractor and accepted by him; but it would seem
to be the better opinion that the
employer must first have either had
actual notice of the defect, or the
facts must be such as to charge him
with constructive notice: Gorham

v. Gross,

125

Mass.,

232;

Sturges v.

Theol. Soc., i3o Mass., 414; Khron
v. Brock, 144 Mass., 516; Congreve,
v. Smith, 18 N. Y., 79; Devlin v.
Smith, 89 N. Y., 47o; Vogel v.
Mayor, 92 N. Y., io; Turner v.
Newburgh, 16 N. E., 344; Bast v.
Leonard, 15 Minn., 304; Scarbrough
v. R. R., ioSo., 316; Chartiers Gas
Co. v. Lynch, 118 Pa., 362; Char-

tiers Gas Co. v. Waters,

123

Pa.,

Congreve v. Morgan, 5 Duer
(N. Y.), 495; Boswell v. Laird, 8
Cal., 469; Fanjoy v. Seales, 29 Cal.,
243; Cunningham v. R. R., 51 Tex.,
5o3; Union Pac. R. R., v. Hause, i
WyO., 27 ; St. L., S. F. & West. R.
R., v. Willis, 16 Pac., 728; Ruck v.
Williams, 3 H. & N., 306; Grote v.
R. R., 2 Exch., 251; Searle v. Laverick, 9 L. R. Q. B., 122; Kansas
City R. R. v.Fitzsimmons, i8 Kans.,
220;

34; Albany v. Cudliff, 2 Comstock
(N. Y.), 174; Carey v. Courcelle, 17
La. Ann., ioS." The employer will
also be liable for the tortious acts

of a contractor, if he ratifies them:
Parker v. Waycross & Fla. R. R.,
81 Ga., 387; Coomes v. Houghton,
102

Mass.,

211.

IV. The second class of exceptions to the general rule are those
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in which the employer, while leaving the contractor to the full exercise of his own discretion in the
execution of the contract work, has
nevertheless made the act complained of his own, either by directly
authorizing it, by entering into a
contract which would necessarily
lead to it, by assuming a duty, or
by neglecting one that is cast upon
him by the law. His liability in
these cases does not depend upon
the doctrine of respondealsuperior.
He isliable, not as the master ofthe
contractor, but as a joint tol-t-feasor
with him. Accordingly,the employer will be held liable if the injurious
act complained of was contemplated
'by the contract: Whitney v. Clifford, 46 Wis., 138; R. R. v. Board,
33 L. J. M. C., 174; Leber v. Minn.
& N. W. R. R., 29 Minn., 156;
Hamilton v. Fond du Lac. 40 Wis.,
47; R. R. v. Drennan, 26 Ill., App.,
263. If the contract work is necessarily dangerous or harmful: Mayor
V. McCary, 84 Ala., 469; Cuff v.
Newark & N. Y. R. R., 35 N.J. L.,
17; Wilson v. Wheeling, I9 W.Va.,
323; Circleville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio
St., 465; Dooley v. Sullivan, 14 N.
E., 566; Haniford v. Kansas, lO3
Mo., 172; Bailey v. Troy & Bost. R.
R., 57 Vt., 252; Ryland v. Fletcher,
3 L. R. H. L., 330. In one case,
however, it was held that the erection of a building adjacent to a
highway, with the usual and necessary excavations, and consequent
obstruction to sidewalk and street,
was not such an inherently dangerous work as to make the owner of
the premises liable: Moline v. McKinnie, 30 11. App., 419. He will
also be liable if the injury is the
necessary result of the work contracted for, but not if it be merely
collateral to the contract, and be
due solely to the negligence of the

contractor or his servants: Haixhurst v. N.Y., 43 Hun. (N. Y.), 588;
McDonell v. Rifle Boom CO., 38 N.
W., 681; Vanderpool v. Husson, 28
Barb. (N. Y.), Ir6; Broadwell v.
Kansas, 75 Mo., 213; Williamson v.
Fisher, 5o Mo., 198; Lockwood v.
Mayor, 2 Hilt (N. Y.), 66; Palmer
v. Lincoln, 5 Neb., 136; Sewall v.
St. .Paul, 20 Minn., 511; Lacour v.

Mayor, 3 Duer (N. Y.), 406; Baxter
v. Warner, 6 Hun. (N. Y.), 585;
Booth v. R. R., 17 N. Y. Suppl.,
336; Pitts v. Highway Board, 19 W.
R., 884; Hilliard v. Richardson, 3
Gray (Mass.), 349; Eno v. Del
Vecchio, 6 Duer (N. Y.), 17; King
v. Livermore, 9 Hun. (N. Y.), 298;
McCafferty v. R. R., 61 N. Y., 178;
Earl v. Beadleston, 42 N. Y. Super.
Ct., 294; Herrington v. Lansingburgh io N. Y., 147; Carman.z,. R.
R., 4 Ohio St., 399; Tiffin v. McCormack, 34 Ohio St., 638; Joliet
v. Harwood, 86111., Iio; Tibbetts v.
R.. R., 62 Maine, 437; Davie v. Levy,
2 So., 395; Water Co. v. Ware, 16
Wall., 566; Hackett v. West Un.
Tel. Co., 49 N. W., 822.
When
work is per se dangerous and the
employer does not stipulate that the
contractor shall use proper precautions to avoid injury to others, the
employer is liable: Matheny v.
Wolffs, 2 Duv. (Ky.), 137. Thus,
when a builder contracts to put a
new roof on a building, butthe contract does not bind him to protect
theproperty of the tenants fromthe
weather, the owner of the building
is liable for his negligence in leaving theroof uncovered, so that rain
came through and damaged the tenant's goods: Sulzbacher v. Dickie,
6 Daly (N. Y.), 469.
When the work contracted for
becomes or occasions a nuisance in
the course of its execution, the employer is liable, if it be not due to
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the sole negligence of the contractor. This is the only satisfactoi:y rule that can be deduted from
the multitude of conflicting cases.
Fuller v. -Bank, i5 Fed. Rep., 875 ;
Storrs v. Utica, 17.N. Y., -1o4;
Bruso v. Buffalo, go N. Y., 679;
Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Gray
(Mass.), 349; Allen v. Willard, 57
Pa., 374; Reed v. Allegheny, 79
Pa., 3oo; Smith v. Simmons, i3
Pa., 32; Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Pa.,
247; Conners v. Hennessey, 112

Mass., 96; ]dmundson v. R. R.,
III Pa., 316; Homan v. Stanley,

66 Pa., 464; Creed v. Hartman, 29
N. Y., 591; Osborn v. Union Ferry
Co., 53 Barb. (N. Y.),629; Ryan v.
Curran, 64 Ind., 345; Wood v.
School Dist., 44 Iowa, 27; Kepperly v. Ramsden, 83 111., 354;
Pfau v. Williamson, 63
16;
R. R. v. Farver, ii1 Ind., 195 ; Robinson v. Webb, ii Bush. (Ky.),
464; Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St., 358;
O'Rourke v. Hart., 7 Bosw. (N. Y.),
51x ; Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall.,
657 (af.S. C., 2 Black, 418); Pettengill v. Yonkers, 116 N. Y., 558;
Walker v. MacMillan, 6 Can. S. C.

nIl.,

R., 241; Knight v. Fox, 5 Exch.,
721 ; Overton v. Freeman, ii C. B.,
867; Peachey v. Rowland, 13 C. B.,

x82; Hole v. R. R., 6 H. & N.,
488 ; Taylor v. Greenhalge, 9 L. R.
Q. B., 487. A municipal corporation, however, cannot exonerate
itself from liability for injuries
caused by a dangerous condition of
its streets and highways,by showing
that that condition was due to the
negligence of a contractor employed by it. It is still obliged to
see that the streets are in a safe
condition for travel: Schweickhardt v. St. Louis, 2 Mo. App., 571 ;
Kemper v. Louisville, 14 Bush
(Ky.), 87; Memphis v. Lasser,
9 Humph. (Tenn.), 760; Mlayor v.

O'Donnell, 53 Md., iio; Grant v.
Brooklyn, 41 Barb. (N. Y.), 381;
Springfield v. LeClaire, 49 111., 476;
Mayor v. Brown, 9 Heisk., x; Mayor
v. Waldron, 49 Ga., 316. Contra:
Pack v. N. Y., 8 N. Y., 222; Kelly
v. N. Y., II N. Y., 432; Wood v.
Watertown, ii N. Y. Suppl., 864;
Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa., 213.
It makes no difference that, by the
contract, the contractor has stipulated to be responsible for all damages
that may be caused in the execution
of the work: Veazie v. R R., 49
Maine, iig; Pettengill v. Yonkers,
ix6 N. "Y., 558; McAllister v. Albany, 18 Oreg., 426; Smith v. St.

Joseph,

42

Mo. App.,

392.

.Contra:

Osborn v. Union Ferry Co., 53 Barb.
(N. Y.), 629. Of course, when the
employer has himself assumed a
personal responsibility for damage,
he will be liable for the acts of the
contiactor: Water Co. v. Ware
16 Wall, 566.
The owner of ground will be liable to the adjacent owner for an

injury to his right of lateral support, caused by a contractor who
makes an excavation thereon:
Brown v. Werner, 40 Md., 15; Stevenson v. Wallace, 27 Gratt. (Va.),
77; Bowers v. Peate, I Q. B. D.,
321; Lemaitre v. Davis, 19 Ch. D.,
281 ; Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Cas.,
740. Contra: Harrison v. Kiser, 4
S. Z., 320; Myer v. Hobbs, 57 Ala.,
175. But the right must first be
affirmatively shown: Gayford v.

Nichols, 9 Exch.,

702.

When the injury conplained of
arises out of the exercise by the
contractor of powers derived from
the charter of his employer-powers
which he would have no right to

exercise except under such authority-the employer is liable. This is
based upon the double ground that
such acts can only be done in pur-
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suance of the direction of the employer, and that the State having
granted these powers to the employer, charges it with the duty of
seeing that they are properly exercised: Lasher v. Wab. Nay. Co.,
14 Ill., 85; Hinde v. Wab. Nay.
Co., 15 Ill., 72 ; Chic., St. P. & Fond
du Lac R. R. v. McCarthy, 20 111.,
385; l1. Cent. R. R. v. Finnigan,
21 111., 646; Chic. & Rock I. R. R.
v. Whipple, 22 Ill., 1O5; West v.
St. L., V. & T. H. R. R., 63 Ill.,
545; Vt. Cent. R. R. v. Baxter, 22
Vt., 365. Contra: Clark v. Vt. &
Can. R. R., 28 Vt., 103.
When the act that causes the injury is done without proper authority, or in violation of an ordinance
or statute, the employer will be
liable for the negligence of the contractor: Walker v. McMillan, 6 Can.
S. C. Rep., 241; Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn., 586; Baxter v. Warner, 6 Hun. (N. Y.), 585; Ullman
v. Han. & St. J. R. R., 67 Mo., 118;
Cairo & St. L. R. R. v. Woolsey, 85
Ill., 370; Rockf., Rock I. & St. L.
R. R. v. Wells, 66 Ill., 321; Brown
v. McLeish, 71 Iowa, 381; Doran v.
Flood, 47 Fed., 543.
When the employer undertakes
the duty of providing machinery
for the contractor, he is bound to
see that it is safe and sufficient to
perform the work; and if it is not,
and he either knew or might have
known of its insufficiency, he will
be liable for any injury caused
thereby to an employee of the contractor, or to a third person: The
Rheola, i Fed. Rep., 926; Milchey
v. Rel. Soc., 125 Mass., 487; ConIon v. R. R., 135 Mass., 195; Riley
v. Steamship Co., 29 La. Ann., 791 ;
Coughtry v. Globe Co., 56 N. Y.,
124; Larock v. Ogdensburgh &
Lake Ch. R. R., 26 Hun. (N. Y.),
382; Homer v. Nicholson, 56 Mo.,

Samuelson v. Cleveland Iron
Co., 49 Mich., 164; Johnson v.
Spear, 76 Mich., 139; Whitney v.
Clifford, 46 Wis., 138 (S. C. 47 N.
W., 835); Heaven v. Pender, ii Q.
B. D., 503. Contra:Burke v. Sugar
Ref. Co., ii Hun. (N. Y.), 354.
When, however, the employer is
under no duty to furnish the machinery or appliances, but merely
permits the contractor to use them,
he will not be liable: Barrett v.
Singer Mfg. Co., i Sweeny (N. Y.),
545. And where the machinery
becomes defective in the contractor's hands, the employer will not
be responsible: King v. R. R., 66
N. Y., 181.
V. In general, the employer will
be liable for the negligence of the
contractor whenever there is a-duty
resting upon him in regard to the
subject-matter of the contract, either
to the public orto individuals: Wyman v. R. R., 46 Maine, 162;
Veazie v. R. R., 49 Maine, ii9;
Mayhew v. Mining Co., 76 Maine,
Ioo; Fink v. St. Louis, 71 Mo., 52;
Speed v. Atl. & Pac. R. R., 71 Mo.,
303 ; P. W. & B. R. R. v. Hahn, 12
At., 479; Silvers v. Nerdlinger, 3o
Ind., 53; Sessengut v. Posey, 67
Ind., 4o8; Allison v. R. R., 64 N.
C., 382; Wilkinson v. Detroit
Works, 73 Mich., 4o5; Pettengill
v. Yonkers, 116 N. Y., 558; Turnpike v. Buffalo, i T. & C. (N. Y.),
537; Matthews v.West Lond. Water
Works, 3 Cam., 4o3; Sly v. Edgley,
6 Esp., 6; Brazier v. Inst., i F. &
F., 507 ; Pendlebury v. Greenhalge,
i Q. B. D., 36; Bauer v. Rochester,
12 N. Y. Suppl., 418 (S. C. 59 Hun.,
616); Dressell v. Kingston, 32
Hun., 533; Groves v.' Rochester,
39 Hun., 5; Delmonico v. N. Y., I
Sandf. Super Ct., 222; Logansport
v. Dick, 70 Ind., 65; and when a
municipal corporation expressly
220;
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agrees to pay all damages caused
by the construction of a public
work, it is, of course, liable: Leeds
:v. Richmond, 102 Ind., 372. This
duty cannot be delegated to a contractor so as -toexonerate the em:ployer from all responsibility for
the negligence of the latter: Storrs
v. Utica, 17 N. Y., io4; Congreve
v. Smith, i8 N. Y., 79; Brusso v.
Buffalo, go N. Y., 679'; Gorham v.

Gross,

125

Mass.,

232;

Welsh v. St.

Louis, 73 Mo., 71; Russell v. Columbia, 74 Mo., 480; Canal Co. v.
'QGraham, 63 Pa., 29o; Homan v.
Stanley, 66 Pa., 464; Impr. Co. v.
Rhoads, i6 Pa., 377; Trainor v.
R. R., 137.Pa., 148; Clark v. Fry,
-8 Ohio St.; 359; Houston & G. N.
R. R. v. Meador, 5o Tex., 77;
McCamus 'v. Gas Light Co., 4o
.Barb. (N. Y.), 38o; 'Mayor v. Me,Cary, 84 Ala., 469; Jacksonville v.
Drew, g Fla., io6; Jefferson v.
Chapman, 127 Ill., 438; Springfield
v. LeClaire, 49 Ill., 476; Mayor v.
Waldron, 49 Ga., 316 ; Nashville v.
Brown, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.), I; Lancaster'v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
S S. W., 23; Francis v. Cockrell, 5
L. R. Q. B., 5oi; Tarry v. Ashton,
I Q. B. D., 314; Stephen v. Com'r's,
3 Ct.'of Seas. Cas., 4th Ser., 535 ;
Hughes v. Percival, 8 App. Cas.,
443; R. R. v. McConnell, 13 S. E.,
828. It is still an open question
whether the statutory requirement
-that a contract shall be given to the
lowest bidder exonerates the employer. In Detroit v. Corey, 9
Mich., I65, CAMPBE.L4, J., in a dis-senting opinion, argued that the
purpose of the provision was manifestly to prevent the city from hay-
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ing its own employees; but the
majority opinion did not touch this
point. In Jame v. San Francisco,
6 Cal., 528, it was decided that in
.ch a case the municipal corporation was not liable; but in Mahanoy
Township v. Scholly, 84 Pa., 136, it
was ruled that such a requirement
did not affect the liability of the
township. The latter would seem
to be the correct ruling; for, as hag
been said, the liability of the employer in such a case does not depend upon the rule of respondeat
sufieior,but upon the duty of the
municipal corporation to see that
its streets are in safe condition for
travel. And where there is no such
duty, it would not be liable, whether
it was obliged to let the contract to
a certain person, or had full power
of selection.
Finally, this rule, which forbids'
the delegation of duty, applies with
peculiar force to those duties which
are imposed by statute, or by charter. In the latter case, particularly,
these duties stand in the place of a
consideration paid for the charter
grants, and the grantee cannot, in
any way, evade his responsibility:
Holden v. Rutland & Burl. R. R.,
30 Vt., 297; Wyman v. R. R., 46
Maine, 162; Huey v. Ind. & Vinc.
R. R., 45 Ind., 320; Pound v. Port
Huron & S. W. R. R., 54 Mich.,
13; Rockf., R3ock I. & St. L. R. R.
v. Heflin, 65 Ill., 366; R. R. v.
Hahn, X2 At., 479; Hole v. R. R.,
6 H. & N., 488; Gray v. Pullen, 5
B. & S., 970; Lowell v. R. R., 23
Pick (Mass.), 24; Dorrity v. Rapp.,
72 N. Y., 307.
ARDEMUS STEWART.

NOTZ.-Owing to the length of the case reported in this number, the Editors were
obliged to omit the "1EditorialNotes."

